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Abstract
This paper begins with the Todaro framework which relates LDC ur
ban unemployment to the existence of an urban-rural wage gap.

An expla- ·

nation of the wa~e gap is developed from aggregate demand conditions in
the urban sector, providing a Keynesian theory of LDC unemployment.
ous policies to alleviate LDC unemployment are considered.

Vari

Aggregate de

mand policies are most certain of success when the response of urban out
put to these policies is low, a situation which has usually been held to
invalidate demand policies in LDC's.

Import substitution policies pro

mote unemployment and should be reversed or even replaced by rural sector
subsidization.
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-2A strong tradition exists in the dev,,,.lopment literatur,:., of viewing
Demand considerations

LDC probl,,ms as being primarily supply problems.

are rarely emphasized except in discussions of the foreign sector (foreign
exchange gaps) and of the trend in output composition (income elasticities
of demand).

Lewis (1), in discarding neo-elassical approaches in favour

of a return to classical principles, finds that "from the point of view of
countries with surplus labour, Keynesianism is only a footnote to neoclassicism •• , ."
Those economists (2) who have explicitly considered the applicabil
0

ity of demand policies to LDC problems in greater detail have been simi
larly skeptical,

The main thesis, expressed in

(3), has been

• • . that although there is abundant labour, at least of
unskilled tyµes, a general increase in demand will not lead
to a general increase in output, because other "co-operating
factors" are needed to work with labour, The traditional
one to take is capital -- i.e., real capital equipment;
nothing much can be done with bare hands alone,
While this hyµothesis of a low output-investment multiplier is often qua
lified, it remains the basis for a rejection of demand oriented cures for

LDC unemployment.

Attention is therefore directed to the need for capital

accumulation, especially in labour intensive forms, as the corrective-for
the capital shortage induced unemployment.
Todaro (4) has presented a model of LDC urban unemployment which
relates unemployment to the existence of an urban-rural wage gap.

His

formulation assumes, rather than explains, the existence of this wage
differential.

Unemployment is then explained by postulating that the level

of unemployment, through its influence on the probability of obtaining
an urban job, is such as to equate the expected urban wage with the rural
wage.
In our model, the wage differential is determined by the level of

-3of ;pgr,egate demand for urban output.

Todaro m•~chanism.

Unemployment is then induced by the

Various policies are considered wi. thin the context of

the mood, and it is shown that they are most certain of alleviating urban
unemployment when the pessimistic multiplier assumption, usually held to
invalidate demand policies in LDC's, is made,

Notation:

A: output of the rural sector
M: output of the urban sector
I: investment in terms of the urban good
S: savings in terms of the urban good

P: priCA of the rural good in terms of the u.rban good
Wm:

wage in the urban sector in terms of the urban good

wa: wage in the rural sector in terms of the urban good

1m:

labour employed in the urban sector

La: labour employed in the rural sector

U: number of unemployed in the urban sector
u: unemployment rate in the urban sector(= U/(U+1m_))

Specification of the Model:
Output in each sector is determined by a short-run production func
tion.

The constant factor in the rural sector is land, that in the urban

sector is the stock of capital equipment.

Thus:
( 1)

(2)

Competiti~e conditions are assumed to prevail in the urban sector.

Profit maximising behaviour establishes the equality of the urban wage and
the short-run marginal product of labour in manufacturing:
(3)

Agricultural production is undertaken by peasant proprietors.

It

is assumed that the implicit rural wage is given by the average product
in agriculture: 1 •

(4)

Equality of the rural wage and the expected urban wage is given
by:
( 5)

where (1-u) is taken as the probability of obtaining an urban job in
conformity with the Todaro for;mulation.
Labour balance is given by:
( 6)

where Lis the total labour force, assumed to be constant.
Savings activity is assumed to be undertaken exclusively by urban
capitalists, who save the whole of their profits:

2

1 •Alternative models of rural wage determination include equality of the
rural wage and the marginal product of labour in agriculture, and the
hYPothesis of a constant institutional wage in agriculture. Substitu
tion of either of these formulations for the average product hYPothesis
does not alter the basic properties of the model developed in equations
(1) - (10).
2 •A formulation of this nature is only adopted for simplicity.

Explicit

-5(7)

Investment activity is also undertaken only by urban capitalists.
The immediate stimulus to investment is the expectation of profits.

A

myriad of factors determine the expected profitability of investments in
LDC's; the rate of interest is only a sub-ordinate consideration.
Investment activity is limited by the ability of entrepreneurs to
identify, plan and execute projects.

The restrictions imposed on invest

ment by entrepreneurial immaturity are further compounded by a lack of
technical and skilled personnel.

An underdeveloped infrastructure may

limit the availability of inputs and the distribution of output.

Con

siderations of this nature have been stressed in the literature on absorp
tive capacity (5).

In addition to these constraints, which derive from

the inherent characteristics of LDC's, are other factors associated with
the role of government in most WC economies.

Administrative rationing

of credit and/or foreign exchange may block otherwise feasible investment
projects while failing to induce alternate investment activity.
The essential conclusion of this view of the investment process 9
one which is similar to that of Hirschman (6), is that there are no auto
matic forces which ensura the~ ante equality of savings and investment.
The level of investment in any short period may thus be taken as given:
( 8)

In equilibrium, savings must equal investment:

consideration of self-contained savings-investment activity in the rural
sector (~•ll• peasant contruction of irrigation wells) does not alter the
relationship between capitalists' saving and investment developed in equa
tions (7) - (9).

-6(9)

I = S

The economy is assumed to be a small open economy with relative
prices given by the world market:
( 10)

P=P

Equations (1) - (10) provide a determinant system of ten equations
in ten unknowns: A, M, I, S, I,n, La, U (or u), wm, Wa and P.

The interpre

tation of the equilibrium generated by this system as a whole is easily
presented through its relation to the usu.al formulation of the dual econo
my model.

Setting U (and hence u) equal to zero in equations (5) and (6)

to give equations (5)' and (6)•, and dropping equation (8) leaves a model
in nine equations and nine unknowns.

This remnant model is a possible

formulation of equilibrium in a Lewis-tYPe dual economy.
The usual assumption of the traditional dual economy model is the
~

ante identity of investment and savings.

If this assumption of depen

dence is replaced by a Keynesian assumption of an independently given
volu.me of investment (by re-instating equation (8)), the system is formally
overdetermined .

On a fonnal level, this problem is resolvetl by introducing

a tenth variable, U (or u), into equations (5)' and (6)•.
The economic functioning of the model is presented with the aid of
Figure I.

Area Q represents industrial profits.

it also represents total savings.
the given volume of investment.
investment,

I.

Under our assumptions,

But, in equilibrium, savings must equal
Hence area Q is given by the level of

Area Q in turn determines the equilibrium employment ir,

the urban sector,

I{,

and the equilibrium urban -wage,~= M'(14_).

Now, if all remaining labour were employed in the rural sector,
there is no reason for the rural -wage, as determined by (4), to equal,~.

"J

-,

.
'

I

\
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-8- .
Assume that "investment is deficient in the sense that

I

is less than the

equilibrium level of savings as determined by the remnant model,
c~quations (1) - (4), (5)', (6)•, (7),-(9) and (10).
urban wage exceeds the rural wage when La =
fulfills two roles.

2:.•..::•

by

In this case, the

L-L*,
and urban unemploymen t
m

By making it less certain that a migrant to the ur-

ban sector will obtain a job, urban unemploymen t lowers the expected
value of the urban wage toward the value of the rural wage.

At the same

time, by removing labour from the rural sector, urban unemployment raises
the rural wa~e.

Equilibrium is attained when a level of unemploymen t (U*)

sufficient to equate the expected urban wage with the rural wage has been
induced (Figure II). 3
(It should be clear from Figures I and II that the equilibrium
determined by the model is unique.

There exists one and only one level

of investment such that U equals zero.)

3. In the language of the absorption literature, unemployment is induced

by a tendency for a country's saving capacity to exceed its absoption
capacity at full employment.
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Policy Issues:
A wide variety of policy instruments is available to alter the level

of urban unemployment.

Among the options are1 programs to increase the

level of private urban investment, government expenditure programs in the
urban or rural sectors, foreign aid financed programs in the urban or
rural sectors, tariffs/export subsidies, wage taxes/subsidies, and profit
taxes/subsidies.

An important distinction among the programs derives from the extent
to which they must be applied before unemployment is reduced.

Some poli

cies, regardless of the extent to which they are pursued, will always have
an unambiguous impact on unemployment.

In this class are foreign aid

financed rural projects and tariff/export subsidies.
In ~igure III, the impact of a foreign aid financed rural project
on employment is illustrated.

Programs of this nature leave w>I: and 1*
m
m

unchanged since the expenditure on domestic manufactures is constant at

I+

w L.
mm

Hence, the E(~m) curve does not shift,

Assigning workers to

rural investment programs effectively lowers Land raises the wa curve;
unemployment is decreased.
A tariff on manufactures (agricultural subsidy) raises (lowers)

unemploymfmt.

This result is depicted as a downward (upward) shift of

the wa curve consequent on a decrease (increase) in P.

Rural employment

is made less (more) attractive at any level of unemployment.

Other poli

cies designed to squeeze the export sector (multiple exchange rates and
export taxes) have similar effects.

Labour is squeezed out of the rural

sector into the pool of urban unemployed,
Thus• the traditional cluster of import substitution policies have
a bias toward creating unemployment.

If policies are adopted to shift

the
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-12jncome distribution in favour of savers, but the level of investment is un
chan£ced, unemploym"mt will be induced.

Trade poliices of this type may,

however, affect the level of investment through their impact on entrepre
neurial optimism.

Note, however, that trade policies do not increase pro

fits unless investment is first increased, a result which differs from
that of traditfonal partial equilibrium analysis.

If trade policies do

affoct the level of investment, the magnitude of their final effect de
pends on the induced chan~e in investment and on the unemployme nt-invest
ment multiplier; the net result is ambiguous.
A second set of policies, if not pursued to the point where unem

ployment is completely eliminated, may actually raise the level of unem
ployment.

An important second best issue is encountered .

If programs can

not be undertaken on a sufficient scale to eliminate unemployme nt, they pos
sibly should not be initiated.

Indeed, the second best policy may be to

run the program in reverse, moving the policy variable away from its zero
unemploymen t value.

These issues are clearly illustrated in an.examinat ion

of the effect of increased investment on the level of unemploymen t.
The unemployme nt-investmen t multiplier, obtained by total differen
tiation of equations (1) - (10), is given by:
dU

cff

where

( 11)

=

and

a. =

are thR elasticity of the urban sector wage bill with respect to an increase
in urban employment and the elasticity of the agricultura l wage with respect
to an increase in the agricultura l labour force.

On an assumption of con-
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Hence unemployment decreases

stant returns to scale in agriculture, a<O.

(increases) as [Lao+ 1ma - (1-u)La] is less (greater) than zero.
ficient condition for a decrease in unemployment is

a<O.

A suf

Note that about

U=O, the unemployment-in vestment multiplier is unambiguously negative,
Now, we also have
1

dM

dl

(12)

= -( 1-o)

The urban output multiplier is an increasing function of

o. Hence, the

lower the urban output multiplier, the lower is o and the lower is the un
employment-inv estment multiplier.

As originally asserted, a pessimistic

assessment of the urban output multiplier leads to an optimistic assess
ment of the unemployment multiplier,:!_. ~., of the decrease in unemployment
which may be expected to accompany an increase in investment.
An interpretation of the effects of an increase in investment is
given with the aid of Figure IV.

Graphically, the increased investment

affects unemployment by changing the positions of both the wa and E(W:)
curve.
curves, and the shape of the E(W"')
m
4
investment shifts the wa curve upward.

an increase in
By raising L*,
II!.
an increase in
By lowering W"',
m

curve.
investment drops the intercept of the E(W"')
m
the new E(w;) curve may be above

?r

Except at this point,

below the old E(~) curve.

If, at any

given value of U, o is less than z-ero, the new curve will lie below the
old one.5

4 dw
a
dL*

As previously derived, unemployment may increase or decrease

-awa

=

L

m

S dE(w*)
m

>O,

for any given value of

U.

a

ow:
=
L*+U
m

.,..

WitiL:
( L*+U)
m

2

Hence, even if O>O, the new E(~) curve
may lie below the old one.

-15with an increase in investment; if o<O unemployment unambiguously decreases.
(The case with o>O but falling unemployment is illustrated.)

Intuitively,

this ambiguity derives from the conflicting influences which a lower urban
wage and higher urban employment have

on the attractiveness of migration.

The net impact of these two factors is summarized in the parameter

o.

This ambiguity is only relevant to small increase in investment.
There is always some level of investment sufficiently high to eliminate un
employment.

Graphically, this result is illustrated by the unambiguous

movement of the intercepts of the wa and E(Wrti) curves to~rd each other, a
process that can be continued until the point of intersection of the two
curves is at the intercepts.

This convergence of the intercepts(!•~•• of

the rural and urban wages) in response to increased investment is the touch
stone of a demand deficient model of LDC unemployment.
While successive increases in investment will ultimately eliminate
unemployment, an increase in investment of the required size may be imprac
tical.

In this case, an increase in investment toward its full employment

level may, as already indicated, increase unemployment.

A policy

of re

ducing investment may be necessary if unemployment is to be somewhat miti
gated.

A trade-off between growth (through investment) and unemployment

ts then present.
Government 8Xpenditure fulfills a role similar, but not identical,
to that of investment.

Expenditure on government employees, under our

savings assumptions, is entirely reflected in increased <lemand for domes
tic manufactures.

From this point of view, government expenditure has

effects identical to those of investment.
With government expenditure, however, there is the additional ques
tion of the increase in government employees.

Whether these employees are

-16employed in the rural sector at the rural wage or in the urban sector at
the manufacturing wage, the effect is to lower La at any level of U.

The

wa curve shifts up even further than it would for an increase in investment
This secondary effect on

equal to the increase in government expenditure.

the rural wage ensures that the unemployment-government rural expenditure
multiplier is unambiguously lower than the unemployment-investment multi
plier.

Government rural expenditure is always somewhat more likely to de

crease unemployment than is investment.
In the case of urban sector expenditure, however, the E(~) curve
is also shifted above the position it would occupy if investment, rather
than government expenditure, were increased,

This shift occurs because an

increase in government urban employees increases the probability of ob
taining an urban job at any level of

I{,~

and

u.

This shift in the

E(W"') curve works to increase unemployment and may overwhelm the effect of
m

the upward shift in the wa curve.

The unemployment-government urban expen-

diture multiplier may be greater or less than the unemployment-investment
multiplier;

it certainly is greater than the unemployment-government rural

multiplier,

Both types of government expenditure, if undertaken on a suf

ficient scale, can be used to eliminate unemployment.
A tax on profits effectively lowers savings for any given level of
L* and w*.
m
m

Since investment is given by

I,

equilibrium in manufacturing

requires an increase in savings and profits, and hence an increase in
and a decrease in

w;.

I{

Both the wa and the E(~) curves are shifted as de

scribed in the section on the effects of increased investment.

For small

changes, the effect of an increase in the profits tax is ambiguous; if the
tax is increased sufficiently, unemployment can be eliminated.

The increased

profits tax may, however, decrease investment by depressing entrepreneurs'

-17expectation s of profits.

In this case, the analysis is complicated con

siderably.
A

final class of policies is represented by the wage subsidy.

Not

only are small changes in the wage subsidy an ambiguous method of obtaining
decreases in unemploymen t, but it is also uncertain whether unemploymen t
can be eliminated by a large scale program of subsidies.

A zero unemploy

ment equilibrium may require a wage tax rather than a subsidy.

This con

fusion over the appropriate direction of a wage tax/subsidy derives from
its uncertain effect on the level of urban sector employment and wages.
wage subsidy may lower~ and raise

w:i,

A

moving the intercept of the E(Witi)

curve upward and that of the wa curve downward. 6

6

Letting t be the rate of wage subsidy and totally differentia ting

-I = M-~I,;*
M'(~)

yields

di;;
dt

=

d~m
=
dt

( 13)

= ( 1-t)w;
L*
(0-1+t)(1-t )
-tW:

(14)
( 15)

( 16)

(G-l+t)( 1-t)

both of which are ambiguous, although d~/dt and dl{/dt are of opposite sign •

. ...._-_·,;.: ..

-18Conclusions:
While the Todaro mechanism provides an explanation of unemployment
given a wage gap, any proposals for unemployment policy must be founded on
an explanation of the wage gap itself.

A demand deficient model provides

a theory of the wage gap, one that is based on the fundamental assumption
of the inequality of savings and investment at full employment.

Once this

context of urban unemployment is established, it becomes clear that a wage
· subsidy.policy is the least appropriate of employment programs.

Not only

is its impact uncertain, but a wage subsidy saCTifices the opportunity to
stimulate future growth offered by policies to increase investment.
Various investment and government expenditure programs can be used
to Aliminate unemployment.

In practice, these policies will not be alter

natives, but can be used in combination.

If full advantage is to be taken

of these policies, however, stress must be placed on careful project plan
ning.

Arbitrary expenditure will fail to benefit from the growth gains

which unemployment reduction through increased investment can have,

The

presumption is that employment and growth can be complementary objectives.
A reduction in the discrimination against the rural sector can also

be expected to lower unemployment.

Import substitution policies which only

elicit low levels of investment (and slow growth) despite greatly favouring
savers are likely to be associated with high rates of unemployment.
Under the most pessimistic assumptions,!•~• M'

=A'= o, no policy

can secure an increase in output consequent on a reduction in unemployment.
In this case, labour is redundant in both sectors.

Unemployment policies

merely substitute rural disguised unemployment for urban open employment.
Of course, urban social and political problems associated with open unem
ployment may make even this trade-off of considerable interest.

Except

-19under improbable assumptions of this nature, a successful unemployment
policy will increase output.

And, as already emphasized, some pessimism

over the increased output deriving from increased urban sector employment
makes for optimism regarding the ease with which unemployment can be
reduced.
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